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Questioning Litigation's Role-Courts and Class
Actions in Canadat
W.A. BOGART*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a society in which there is no generic document guaranteeing
basic rights, where the notion of parliamentary supremacy is firmly en-
trenched and where courts adhere to the classic paradigm of litigation-
lawsuits controlled by a limited number of parties, heard by a passive judge
dealing with isolated questions-and where there is a strong expectation that
courts will not cause substantial and sudden shifts in the law, staying clear
of overtly political decisions, interpreting the law consistent with established
norms. Imagine too that this society's expectation for social and political
change is focused upon the legislature where there is an established left wing
party which forms governments in various political units from time to time
and is a strong force in the various legislatures pushing for social welfare
schemes and other equalization programs. What would happen to such a
society and to judges if sudden jolts were delivered with substantial potential
for transforming the role and image of courts? What if one of these shocks
were class actions? Would they be absorbed into the emerging consciousness
of courts and reflected in their image or would they be rejected as antithetical
to their traditions?
This is Canada. A country where the judicial role has seemed dwarfed in
comparison with American courts' part in giving expression to public values
but where, by contrast, the legislatures have seemed more active and pro-
gressive as the primary vehicle for social and economic change spurred on
by a politics heavily influenced by a resilient left wing party.' Whatever the
t Copyright 1987 by W.A. Bogart.
* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Windsor. Thanks to Linda Bertoldi and Jeff
Berryman for their many helpful comments. Special thanks to Brian Etherington, particularly
concerning the introduction and conclusion of the paper which he read, discussed (and disagreed
with) in many helpful ways.
1. There are three major parties in Canada which operate at both the federal and provincial
levels: Progressive Conservatives, Liberals and the New Democratic Party (NDP). American
observers would recognize elements of the Republican and Democratic parties in the Liberals
and Progressive Conservatives. Determining which of the two are closer to which of the other
two will not be attempted here. The New Democratic Party has been consistently identified
with progressive-leftish policies. While it has never formed the government at the federal level,
it has in several provinces and it is a strong opposition both federally and provincially. Let
me provide two current examples. First, in Ontario last year the Liberals managed to turn out
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reality based on close and careful analysis and whatever the future may
hold, a broad comparison of the two legal cultures since roughly the end
of the Second World War seems to provide pronounced contrast on the part
of judges and legislatures. Social change, protection of frail interest groups-
women, racial minorities-, welfare recipients, environmentalists-and even
limited wealth redistribution are areas where American courts appear to have
provided leadership 2 to the praise of supporters and scorn of critics alike.'
The opposite seems true in Canada. In Canada erection of income security
programs, protection of minority rights, recognition of the changing role of
women, the importance of the environment and the provision of good and
universally available medical care, to list only some examples, have been, by and
large, the work of legislatures. 4 This is not to provide a precise, evaluative
statement for comparison to those who find such change attractive. It is to
suggest broad patterns of differences in terms of judicial and parliamentary
activity for such change in the two societies. Adding to the diversity is the
clamor in some quarters in America for curtailment of courts, perhaps driven
as much by dissatisfaction with the way such authority has been employed
as anything else. By contrast, the potential for marked expansion of the
judicial role and the function of litigation in Canada is imminent, though
how that role will develop and whether it can reflect the nature and structure
of Canadian society is very much in question.
the Conservatives after a lengthy rule only by forming an alliance with the NDP which included
an agreement to implement many of the NDP's policies in exchange for their support in the
legislature. Second, in a recent survey of business leaders concerning their views of federal
politics and of the heads of the three parties, the leader of the NDP was ranked first (C+)
followed by the Prime Minister, a Progressive Conservative (C-) and then the leader of the
opposition, a Liberal (D+). See Reid, No Honours For Ottawa, The Globe and Mail, Nov.
1986, (Report on Business Magazine), at 15.
2. Books, of varying quality, have been written trying to understand why courts have
followed the paths which they have. See, e.g., D. HoRowITz, TaE COURTS AND SOCIAL POICY
(1977); J. LIEBERMAN, THE Lrioious SocmTY (1981); J. LUKAS, COMMON GROUND (1985); M.
MARKS, THE SUING OF AMERICA: WHY AND How WE TAKE EACH OTHER TO COURT (1981); D.
MONTI, A SEMBLANcE OF JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE PURSUIT OF ORDER IN
URBAN AMERICA (1985).
3. Consider the amount of serious attention and careful reporting which is paid to the
United States Supreme Court in the press. Take, for example, one item: the recent interview
with Justice Brennan concerning his views of the Court, his role, the ascendancy of Justice
Rehnquist to the Chief Justice position, and the charges by William Bradford Reynolds, the
Assistant Attorney General for civil rights who has attacked Justice Brennan's "radical egal-
itarianism." See Leeds, A Life on the Court, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1986 (Magazine), at 25. I
venture to suggest that a similar article would not appear in the Canadian press particularly
in terms of a judge assessing his own views and those of the other members of the Court in
"left" and "right" terms.
4. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE ECONOMIC UNION AND DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS FOR
CANADA (1985) [hereinafter MACDONALD REPORT] (informally known as the Macdonald Report,
named after its Chair). In commenting about interest groups' lack of use of courts to achieve
reform, the Report observes: "This lack is no doubt explained by ... the Canadian legal
community's widely held perception that policy making was not the proper business of the
courts." III MACDONALD REPORT at 303.
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The common law model of the lawsuit in Canada, as in other societies
sharing that tradition, viewed litigation as a method of dispute resolution
focused upon the determination of rights and remedies on an individual
basis and confined to isolated questions based upon private and autonomous
ordering.5 A civil action contained a plaintiff's claim to entitlement answered
by the defendant and heard by a passive, distant judge (or jury) establishing
the facts and applying the relevant rule. For the successful plaintiff the
remedy was simple and straightforward-most often monetary compensation
or sometimes a directive to return something or to perform a clearly defined
act-while the defeated plaintiff was to be heard from no more. A court's
role was constricted and the litigation was an isolated, contained event.
This image of the civil action constrained and limited to private arrange-
ment is deeply imbedded within the Canadian legal imagination. We will see
that it strongly influenced the Supreme Court in its rejection of any signif-
icant liberalization of class actions by the courts. And its hold on the judicial
mind can be demonstrated in other areas which potentially challenge this
traditional model. For example, although some courts, including provincial
appellate courts, have been much more liberal, 6 the Supreme Court on the
whole has taken a severe approach to intervention and its potential for
diluting control of the litigation by the immediate parties. 7
But there are other indications of how rapidly courts can relinquish this
established vision of litigation. Since 1975, the Supreme Court has visited
the issue of standing four times' and has, on each occasion, loosened the
reins on the requirement that ability to sue must be based on a traditional
legal interest-a pecuniary, proprietary or economic claim or one to personal
liberty.9 In doing so, the Court abandoned one of the central tenets of the
5. See Brooks, The Judge and the Adversary System, in THE CANADrA JuDIcIARY 90 (A.
Linden ed. 1976); Wildsmith, An American Enforcement Model of Civil Process in a Canadian
Landscape, 6 DALHousm L.J. 71 (1980-81).
6. E.g., Canadian Labour Congress v. Bhindi & London, 61 B.C.L.R. 85 (C.A. 1985);
Societe des Acadiens du Nouveau Brunswick Inc. v. Minority Language School Bd. No. 50 &
Ass'n of Parents for Fairness in Educ., 54 N.B.R.2d 198 (C.A. 1984) (Gord Falls District 50
Branch (intervenor); affirmed on the intervention point by the Supreme Court of Canada, May
1986, unreported); Bank of Montreal v. Hatheway Realty, 47 N.B.R.2d 81 (C.A. 1983);
Wotherspoon v. Canadian Pac., 20 O.R. 72 (C.A. 1981).
7. Intervention in the Supreme Court of Canada is documented and discussed in Welch,
No Room at the Top: Interest Group Intervenors and Charter Litigation in the Supreme Court
of Canada, 43 U. TORoNTo FAC. L. Rnv. 204 (1985). It is difficult to discuss the Supreme
Court's decisions on intervention since it virtually never gives reasons. But Welch shows, through
an analysis of the results of intervenor applications, that the Court has been very inconsistent
in its treatment of such applications. She argues, pointing to other developments in the Court,
that this could and should change towards a more consistently liberal attitude towards inter-
vention.
8. See Minister of Justice of Can. v. Borowski, 2 S.C.R. 575 (1981); Nova Scotia Bd. of
Censors v. McNeil, 2 S.C.R. 265 (1976); Thorson v. Attorney Gen. of Can., 1 S.C.R. 138
(1975); Minister of Finance of Canada v. Finlay (1986) (unreported case).
9. See, e.g., Bogart, Standing and the Charter: Rights and Identity, in CHARTER LGATION
(Sharpe ed. 1987) (forthcoming).
19871
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
classical adversarial system, venturing into terrain to an extent charted by
possibly no other common law court. The Court devised a requirement that
the plaintiff have a "genuine interest"-a vague test instructive only in its
insistence that a traditional legal interest is no longer to be the boundary
between those who are and those who are not entitled to litigate. On none
of the four occasions did the Court really attempt to square its loosening
of standing strictures with the traditional adversarial model. It seemed con-
vinced that the need to ensure some means to test the question in issue was
reason enough. Reason enough it may be, but what is significant here is
how the Court relinquished the classic paradigm in the context of standing
in a manner that might amaze many American observers while adhering to
it so tenaciously in other contexts, particularly as we shall see, in class
actions.
Since 1982 Canadian courts have been empowered to review legislation
and governmental action, both provincial and federal, on the basis that they
invade certain fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. 0 Despite their tradition of incremental change, if any, and a clear
avoidance of overtly political decisions which challenged the image of judicial
neutrality, the courts have by and large embraced their enhanced role under
the Charter. A number of commentators, particularly of various leftish
stripes, have condemned such a shift of power to the courts, arguing that
the chances are better for reform in the legislatures and that programs of
equality and redistribution are likely to be hobbled when second guessed by
a tenured, elite judiciary." Moreover, there is a disturbing tendency on the
part of the Supreme Court of Canada in appearing to describe the Charter
as dedicated to an individualism which enjoys its greatest freedom and
potential when the government is kept at bay.' 2
But those willing to judge the Charter and the courts in terms of what
actually occurs have generally awarded the courts, and, particularly the
Supreme Court, at least satisfactory grades for sensitivity to their enhanced
10. CANA>IAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS (Constitution Act, 1982, as enacted by
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, ch.ll).
11. E.g., Hutchinson, Charter Litigation and Social Change: Legal Battles and Social Wars,
in CHARTER LmGATnON (Sharpe ed. 1987); Ison, The Sovereignty of the Judiciary, ADEL. L.
Rnv. 1 (1985); Glasbeek & Mandel, The Legalization of Politics in Advanced Capitalism: The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 2 SoCmAwsT STUD. 84 (1984). For a less partisan
view by a political scientist, see Russell, The Political Purposes of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, 61 CAN. BAR Rav. 30 (1983).
12. For example, in one of the initial cases, the Supreme Court of Canada said the function
of the Charter "is to provide ... for the unremitting protection of individual rights and
liberties." Hunter v. Southam Inc., 2 S.C.R. 145, 155 (1984); "An emphasis on individual
conscience and individual judgment ... lies at the heart of our democratic political tradition."
R. v. Big M Drug Mart, I S.C.R. 295, 346 (1985).
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status . 3 Of course their decisions have been criticized 4 but there is no
evidence of a right wing rampage to eradicate the elaborate social welfare
schemes and other equality programs which have been among Canada's
proudest achievements in the last fifty years.' 5 More particularly, the courts
seem to understand that, at times, there is need to conduct Charter litigation
and related issues differently from the way the classical model of the lawsuit
might indicate. For example, the Supreme Court recently struck down Man-
itoba's English-only statutes as violating the constitutional requirement of
bilingualism in that province.' 6 What is of importance here is the Court's
novel assertion that it would retain jurisdiction of the case and supervise
the remedial phase over a stipulated period of time to ensure that the
provincial legislature brings its laws into constitutional conformity.
7
Moreover, it has been argued that the Charter, while enlarging the courts'
role, has woven a complicated relationship between judges and legislators
which belies a simple abdication of power to the courts. Whatever the
difficulties of interpretation, section 1 contemplates limits upon the rights
and freedoms embodied in the Charter 8 and there is a capacity for legislative
override of judicial decisions concerning the Charter, in some instances.' 9
Further, while the Charter clearly reflects protection of individual rights
from the state,20 as traditionally conceived it also contains provisions re-
flecting the goals and values to be nurtured by government: authorization
of affirmative action programs, 2' the guarantee of minority language rights, z2
13. See, e.g., Fairly, Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1984-85 Term, 8 Sup. CT.
L. REv. 53 (1986); Fairly, Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1983-84 Term, 7 Sup. CT.
L. REv. 63 (1985).
14. E.g., Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), 48 C.R.3d 289
(S.C.C. 1986). Also see the criticism in Cameron, The Motor Vehicle Reference and Relevance
of American Doctrine in Charter Adjudication, in CHARTER LrriATioN, supra note 9.
15. "Government income security programs are a fundamental part of the social consensus
by which Canadians live. They express, perhaps better than any other collective activity, our
commitment to equity, security and sharing." II MACDONALD REPORT, supra note 4, at 771-
72.
16. Reference Re Language Rights Under the Manitoba Act, 1870, 19 D.L.R.4th 1 (1985).
This case did not involve the Charter but presented issues concerning language rights very
similar to those which could be decided under the Charter.
17. Kerr, The Remedial Power of the Courts After the Manitoba Language Rights Case,
6 WNVMSOR Y.B. Accass JUST. (1987)(forthcoming).
18. Section 1 states: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights
and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
19. This provision is in § 33 of the Charter.
20. For example, the Charter provides for: freedom of expression (§ 2), right to life, liberty
and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with
the principles of fundamental justice (§ 7), legal rights-rights against unreasonable search and
seizure, right not to be arbitrarily detained, etc. (§§ 8-14), and the equal protection and equal
benefit provisions (§ 15).
21. Id. at §§ 6(4), 15(2).
22. Id. at § 23.
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the provision for aboriginal rights,2 the dictate to interpret the Charter
consistent with multiculturalism24 and the absence of protection of property
rights.Y
Still one view of this increased judicial activity under the Charter is
insightful in light of the historical relationship between Canadian courts and
legislatures. The worry is less that judges will impose their views on a
democratic majority than that critical social and political questions will be
translated into legal issues and fall to the workings of judges and lawyers
instead of being left with the citizenry to work out acceptable and supportable
solutions.2 6 So the coming of the Charter has been significant not only in
terms of what the rights and freedoms it recognizes will mean but also in
terms of the light which has been focused on courts, the judicial role and
the courts' place in the political structure of society.
But in the saga of class actions, to be told shortly, the Supreme Court
has recently reaffirmed the classical model of litigation, reflecting a belief
that class actions are an assault upon the essence of the judicial role. The
sanctioning of collective action in courts, the Court has warned, must come
from specific and express statutory guidance and there have, indeed, been
detailed legislative initiatives proposed and enacted. How and why class
actions have proved so controversial, particularly in relation to courts and
the judicial role in litigation, is the question explored here. The paper begins
by examining the evolution of class actions in Canada away from the stric-
tures imposed by the English courts at the beginning of the twentieth century
and then proceeds to analyze the Supreme Court's decision which arrested
such development. Then two recent legislative developments are analyzed:
one enacted in Quebec and another proposed in Ontario. These provide
alternative images of how courts can accommodate collective action growing
out of the tradition of litigation in Canada. Finally, the paper draws con-
clusions concerning the significance of class actions for the judicial role,
returning to some of the points made in the opening, paragraphs of the
paper.
23. Id. at §§ 25, 35.
24. Id. at § 27.
25. For works discussing these other rights and freedoms and the consequence of their
presence in the Charter, see Magnet, The Supreme Court of Canada and the Charter of Rights
(paper presented to the Conference on the Supreme Court of Canada, Oct. 2-4, 1985); Gold,
A Principled Approach to Equality Rights: A Preliminary Inquiry, 4 Sup. CT. L. Ray. 181
(1982); III MACDONAmD REPORT, supra note 4, at 306; Bogart, supra note 9. For an emotional
plea for the protection of collective bargaining in (or from) the Charter from a leader of the
labour movement, see S. Carr, Speech Presented to George M. Duck Lecture, University of
Windsor (Nov. 1985).
26. Russell, supra note 11, at 52; Russell, The Effect of a Charter of Rights in the Policy
Making Role of Canadian Courts, 25 CAN. PuB. ADmN. 1 (1982).
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I. CLASS ACTIONS AND THE JUDIcIARY: EVOLUTION AND REJECTION
A. The English Origins of Class Actions
Historically the English common law has strongly influenced many de-
velopments in Canadian law, including class actions. So a brief treatment
of the evolution of class actions-and the arresting of that evolution-is
necessary background. Class actions had their origins in equity where all
parties affected by a suit were required to be joined.27 But this requirement
resulted in problems since it could be very difficult or even impossible to
join all affected parties. The desire to bind all parties without imposing
unreachable standards for joinder was the source of the representative suit-
the class action's predecessor.2 Through such litigation many individuals
could be represented and, because these individuals were bound, multiple
proceedings were avoided. Equity courts were liberal in their acceptance of
the need for representative suits to meet the emerging reality of collective
and group action. 29
The Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873,30 fused law and equity,
making class actions available for the pursuit of common law remedies,
most importantly, damages. Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure enacted under
the 1873 Act 1 was the extent of legislative guidance and it continues, with
minor alterations in most Canadian jurisdictions, 32 to be the bare text to the
courts for class actions in England and Canada. 33 The exception is Quebec
27. For the history of class actions, see Kazanjian, Class Actions in Canada, 11 OSGOODE
HAL L.J. 397 (1973); Williams, Consumer Class Actions in Canada-Some Proposals for
Reform, 13 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1; ONTAr.o LAW REFORM CoMMIssION, REPORT ON CLAss
AcTIONS [hereinafter OLRC REPORT] (volume I, chapter 2 and volume II, chapter 14 provide
historical background of class actions).
28. I OLRC REPoRT, supra note 27, at chs. 2, 5.
29. II OLRC REPoRT, supra note 27, at ch. 14, p. 520.
30. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, ch. 66 (U.K.). In Ontario the fusion took place
by virtue of the Ontario Judicature Act, 1881, ch. 5.
31. Rule 10 stated: "Where there are numerous parties having the same interest in one
action, one or more of such parties may sue or be sued, or may be authorized by the Court
to defend in such action on behalf or for the benefit of all parties so interested."
32. In fact English class actions are governed by 0. 15, Rule 12, 1965 Rules of the Supreme
Court, which is somewhat longer than the original Rule 10 but provides very little further
guidance. Canadian jurisdictions with a rule based on 0. 15, Rule 12 are Federal Court Rules,
C.R.C., 1978, ch. 663, Rule 1711; British Columbia Supreme Court Rules, O.C. 1627/76, B.C.
Reg. 310/76 as amended, Rule 5(11), (12), and (13); Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules and
Related Rules, Rule 5.09; Prince Edward Island Rules of Court, Rule 5.09.
33. Manitoba Queen's Bench Rules, Man. Reg. 26/45 as amended, Rule 58; Supreme Court
Rules, Alta. Reg. 390/68 as amended, Rule 42; Saskatchewan Queen's Bench Rules 1967 as
amended and consolidated, Rule 70; New Brunswick Rules of the Supreme Court, Reg. 82-73,
Rule 5; Newfoundland, The Rules of the Supreme Court, scheduled to the Judicature Act,
1987]
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which in the late 1970's enacted detailed class action legislation.3 4 The initial
years of the twentieth century found the English courts continuing a liberal
approach to class actions. Two decisions of the House of Lords" were
particularly clear in emphasizing that the courts were to be flexible and
adaptable in accommodating group and collective interests: "The principle
on which the rule is based forbids its restriction to cases for which an exact
precedent can be found in the reports. [It] . . .ought to be applied to the
exigencies of modern life as occasion requires. ' 3 6
But all this changed because of one case decided in 1910 whose shadow
fell across class actions in England and Canada for the next seventy-five
years. In Markt & Co. v. Knight Steamship Co. 37 the plaintiff brought a
class action to recover damages for cargo lost as a result of war. Each
member of the three judge panel gave reasons and, though the suit was
rejected as a class action, two of the judges indicated no retreat from the
liberal approach previously established towards class actions., But, inexpl-
icably, history seemed to lose these two judgments and instead highlighted
that of Fletcher Moulton, L.J., who rejected the suit in a sweeping de-
nouncement of this form of litigation.
Fletcher Moulton, L.J., unqualifiedly rejected class actions, when damages
were in issue, on the grounds that they were personal to the plaintiff,39 and
when the members of the class had separate contracts with the defendant. 40
C.S. Nfld. 1916, ch. 83, 0. 15, Rule 9.
In the case of Ontario the former rule was Supreme Court of Ontario Rules of Practice,
R.R.O. 1980, Req. 540, Rule 75. The rules of court and the enabling legislation were overhauled
in 1984. See Courts of Justice Act, 1984, S.O. 1984, ch. 11 and the Rules of Civil Procedure
enacted under the authority of that Act. Rule 12 is the present rule governing class actions but
it makes no changes of substance, as the drafters of the rule contemplated that substantial
changes would come about in response to the overhaul recommended in the Ontario Law
Reform Commission's Report on Class Actions.
34. See R.S.Q. 1977, ch. C-25, arts. 999-1051, as enacted by S.Q. 1978, ch. 8, s. 3 [hereinafter
C.C.P.]. The legislation was passed on June 8, 1978, and went into effect shortly thereafter.
35. Duke of Bedford v. Ellis, 1901 App. Cas. 1; Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalgamated Soc'y of
Ry. Servants, 1901 App. Cas. 426.
36. Taff Vale, 1901 App. Cas. at 443. "Given a common interest and a common grievance,
a representative suit was in order if the relief sought was in its nature beneficial to all whom
the plaintiff proposed to represent." Ellis, 1901 App. Cas. at 8.
37. 2 K.B. 1021 (1910).
38. The concurring judge was Vaughan Williams, L.J., who concluded that the class action
failed because of a lack of "common purpose" or "common interest" because the contracts
might differ and because there was an absence of legal connection among individuals. Had
there been a common purpose he judged there could have been a class action where individual
members would come forward to prove their claims. Id. at 1030-32. The dissenting Judge
Buckley, L.J., rejected the suggestion that separate contracts or the lack of a common fund
were barriers to class actions. In addition he contemplated proceedings where the representative
plaintiff would obtain a declaration of liability and there would then be separate proceedings
to determine the individual claims. Id. at 1044-48.
39. Id. at 1035.
40. Id. at 1040.
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It is difficult to imagine that such a position could take such strong hold,
but hold it did. What did he mean when he suggested that damages were
"personal" to each member and why should separate contracts by themselves
disqualify these procedures? What seemed to horrify the judge the most was
that some separate contracts and damages issues would necessitate individual
proceedings if the common questions were resolved in favor of the class. It
is the possibility of two parts to the suit, one dealing with common issues
and the other with individual ones, which, since Markt, has been most
troublesome for the courts.
B. The Embrace of Markt and the Struggle to Take Hold
There were aspects of the dual procedures concerning resolution of com-
mon questions and individual issues which were problematic and were ar-
ticulated in the cases, including Markt: for example, upon what basis should
discovery of individual claims proceed and how should cost rules apply? But
these issues could have been solved by resort to the rules of procedure and
by minimal judicial inventiveness. What the two-part procedures did do was
set class actions apart from the traditional model of litigation. The resolution
of individual issues vividly demonstrated that, although class actions were
group proceedings with many individuals bound together by certain common
issues, those individuals were separate just the same, with many views about
how the litigation should be conducted, about what the group's interests
were and about who was in the group. Indeed, some individuals might be
completely indifferent to the action taken in their name. This marked de-
parture from classical concepts of litigation as the product of autonomous
ordering, presided over by the aloof judge and based on fixed and determined
rules, was something which needed to be curbed.
It has also been suggested that there were two other factors present in
Anglo-Canadian judicial attitudes during the first part of the twentieth
century which resulted in such severe strictures on class actions.41 One was
the triumph of formalism, the attitude that courts should relinquish their
claim to creativity and adaptability and instead defer to precedents and to
the supremacy of parliament by a literal interpretation and application of
legislation. 42 Formalism dictated that the meager legislative guide in the
41. See Bankier, Class Actions for Monetary Relief in Canada: Formalism or Function, 4
WINDSOR Y.B. AccaSS JusT. 229, 245-48 (1984).
42. Formalism, according to Atiyah, represents the following:
Formalism really represents an attitude of mind rather than anything else; the
attitude is that of the judge who believes that all law is based on legal doctrine
and principles which can be deduced from precedents; that there is only one
'correct' way of deciding a case; that it is not the function of the judge to invoke
policy considerations, or even arguments about the relative justice of the parties'
19871
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codified rule concerning class actions represented the outer limit rather than
a basic guide for further judicial embroidery. 43 We will see that such a
disposition proved to be the dominant attitude in the Supreme Court of
Canada in the 1980's when the Court was called upon to revisit a hundred
years of class actions and attempts to break away from the dead hand of
Markt.
A second and related factor was the social and political context in which
claims to an expansive class action were made. 44 Anglo-Canadian courts by
the early twentieth century were developing an antipathy towards the group
and collective interests which class actions, by definition, were to represent.
In addition, the rise of left wing political parties suggested that any movement
towards social goals at odds with nineteenth century laissez-faire individu-
alism would be the work of legislatures with no need for aid from courts
who viewed themselves as the preserve of an individualism that now seemed
threatened. Thus actions by such groups as consumers, environmentalists
and civil rights activists-often wanting to use class actions to fortify small
or weak individualized claims-were unlikely to find favor with courts de-
veloping biases against such interests and in favor of interests they viewed
as being more consistent with nineteenth century individualism.4 5
claims; that the reasons behind principles and rules are irrelevant; that the role
of the judge is purely passive and interpretive; that law is a science of principles,
and so on.
P. ATriYAH, THE RisE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CoNTRAcT 338, 660-61 (1979), quoted in
Bankier, supra note 41, at 234 n.21.
43. Atiyah describes the shift to formalism as follows:
[U]ntil the middle of the nineteenth century English law and lawyers were receptive
to influences from outside the law .... [B]y the middle of the century, the
influence of new external ideas was coming to an end, at least in the sense that
judges were less willing to discuss such policy issues openly in their judgments.
From 1850 or thereabouts, the phenomenon of formalism took an increasing hold
upon English legal thought .... [Formalism] involved rejection of the lawmaking
power of the judge, rejection of the relevance of policy issues to legal questions,
belief that the law was a deductive science of principles, and that the one 'true'
answer to legal questions could be found by a strictly logical process. There is
some evidence to suggest that the full flowering of formalism did not take place
until after the First World War. For though judges and lawyers had for at least
half a century before then been confining their attention more narrowly to the
law proper, and ignoring outside ideas in economics or political thought, it is
also true that these judges had been less fearful of appeals to policy, fairness,
and the sense of justice.
Id. at 660-61, quoted in Bankier, supra note 41, at 245 n.65.
44. Bankier, supra note 41, at 246-47.
45. Atiyah suggests that there was judicial bias against the very interests class actions were
likely to foster:
[The refusal to discuss policy issues is itself almost always a decision which
consciously or unconsciously forwards certain policies .... [Tihere were... biases
which became especially noticeable in the inter-war period, for example, an anti-
consumer bias, a bias favouring those who used written forms for their contracts,
a bias in favour of institutions like companies and against individuals, like share-
[Vol. 62:665
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So there were any number of Canadian cases up to, and in some instances
during, the 1970's which rejected class actions either because class members
had contracted separately with the defendant, had claimed damages, or both.
For example, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Shields v. Mayor6 boldly
asserted that since each class member had a separate contract, the class
action should not be permitted. Similarly, a class action for damages for
nuisance-an initial attempt at environmental protection-was dismissed on
the grounds that the claim of the plaintiff was "personal and must differ
from the claims of his neighbours, which may be more or less." 47
Beginning in the 1970's the Canadian courts, haltingly and unsurely, began
to re-examine the strictures on class actions and to loosen their grip. They
did this because the groups and associations-environmentalists, civil rights
activists, and consumer representatives-had become much better organized
and had achieved substantive rights which they wanted enforced by the
courts. In addition, there was the influence of United States Federal Rule
23 and the class actions being brought under it.48 Canadian law and insti-
tutions may be leery of the pressures exerted by American legal developments
but they are influential nevertheless. 49 Whatever the reality, the perception
that the Americans had fashioned a powerful device for judicial remedy of
mass wrongs increased the movement for liberalization of class actions in
Canada.50
The evolution that took place in the 1970's and 1980's focused upon
loosening the restrictions imposed by Markt. The courts had to recognize
that individual contracts, by themselves, would not bar a class action but
holders.... In all these respects the 1960's and still more the 1970's have seen
a marked swing away from the trends of the inter-war period.
P. ATIYAU, supra note 42, at 665-66, quoted in Bankier, supra note 41, at 247 n.72.
46. 1 D.L.R. 776 (1953); see also Agnew v. Sault Marie Bd. of Educ., 2 C.P.C. 243 (1976)
(Ont. H.C.J. in Chambers); Preston v. Hilton, 48 O.L.R. 172, 55 D.L.R. 647 (1920) (H.C.
Dir.); Johnston v. Consumers' Gas Co. of Toronto, 23 O.A.R. 566 (1896), aff'd, 67 L.J.P.C.
33 (1898). But cf. ]Bowen v. MacMillan, 21 O.W.N. 23 (1921) (H.C. Dir.) (claim on behalf of
members of a trade union against members of another trade union to recover lost wages and
damages for conspiracy).
47. Turtle v. City of Toronto, 56 O.L.R. 252, 267 (1924) (S.C. App. Dir.). But cf. Bowen,
21 O.W.N. 23.
48. Indeed, the initial articles and proposals for statutory change adopted Rule 23 with
very little change. See, e.g., Williams, Consumer Class Actions in Canada-Some Proposals
for Reform, 13 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1 (1975); 1 NEw BRuNswiCKc DEP'T OF JUsTiCE, LAW
REFORM DIVISION, TmRD REPORT OF THE CONSUMER PROTECTION PROJECT (1976).
49. See, e.g., Fairley, Enforcing the Charter: Some Thoughts on an Appropriate and Just
Standard for Judicial Review, 4 Sup. CT. L. REv. 218, 238 (1982) ("American examples have
never been particularly popular candidates for adoption in Canada: after all, our history is in
large part a reaction to the continued omnipresence of the United States.").
50. The then Chairman of the Ontario Law Reform Commission expressed a number of
"reservations" concerning the Commission's Report on Class Actions. At one point he observed:
"Indeed, in assessing the Ontario position, I am concerned that we should be unduly guided
by the American experience, so richly documented in the literature to which the Report refers."
3 OLRC REPORT, supra note 27, at 851.
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this recognition was not difficult since no ratioial explanation had ever been
produced for such a bar. More difficult was isolation of the circumstances
under which a class action could proceed even when separate proceedings
would be necessary. As soon as courts began to acknowledge that two stage
class actions were legitimate, they were faced with a range of related issues
which had been suppressed by the obsession with Markt: the appointment
of the representative plaintiff and ensuring his or her capacity to represent
the class, notice to class members, the conduct of the action, discovery, and
settlement. Given the complexity of class actions, the restrictive legacy of
Markt and all the rhetoric surrounding class actions in the United States in
this period, the progress made by some Canadian courts was impressive.
Two cases from the British Columbia courts first questioned the narrow-
ness of Markt. The British Columbia Court of Appeal in Shaw v. Real
Estate Board of Greater Vancouver1 addressed a claim for an accounting
to recover levies alleged to have been wrongly assessed against Vancouver
real estate salesmen who constituted the class. The Court permitted the class
to proceed despite the fact that assessments on an individual basis would
be necessary if the class were successful on the common questions. As a
matter of technical reasoning, there was consistency between the judgment
of the Court and the earlier cases because, since the remedy was characterized
as equitable, the suit did not contravene Markt's rule that damages, especially
individualized ones, could not be sought in a class action. Further, the Court
characterized the money said to have been wrongly assessed as a "common
fund," something the older cases had also said should be present.5 2 More
importantly, the Court clearly supported class actions as a legitimate way
to try to vindicate the alleged wrongs. It acknowledged that there might be
extensive proceedings to establish the amounts due to class members. But it
perceived a class action as the fairer and more efficient means when compared
with the difficulties involved in a series of separate lawsuits:
It is quite clear that if the action were to reach the stage of deter-
mination of remedies ... there would have to be long, detailed and
difficult accountings .... If such a stage is so reached, I cannot but
think that the representative action is the only fair and convenient way
that the remaining troublesome matters could be efficiently resolved. 3
The second British Columbia case, Chastain v. British Columbia Hydro
& Power Authority,5 4 involved a claim for a declaration that the defendant
utility lacked authority to take the security deposits it was demanding, a
return of the monies already taken and an injunction to restrain further
51. 36 D.L.R.3d 250, 4 W.W.R. 391 (B.C.C.A. 1973). The action was dismissed at trial.
5 W.W.R. 193 (B.C.S.C. 1974).
52. Id. at 255, 4 W.W.R. at 396.
53. Id.
54. 32 D.L.R.3d 443, 2 W.W.R. 481 (B.C.S.C. 1972).
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claims for such deposits. 55 The class action proceeded and the defendant was
enjoined from demanding, collecting or keeping security deposits. The Court
showed its ingenuity by ordering the defendant to return deposits taken by
crediting them to the customers' next bills.5 6
In Ontario a number of cases challenged the restrictiveness of Markt but
none contained a thorough examination of class actions and the basis for
formulating how, if at all, class actions were to develop. Instead, consistent
with their more modest and conservative role in other areas, the Ontario
courts permitted incremental dilution of the strength of Markt. Nevertheless,
there was enough there to hope that class actions would, indeed, be refor-
mulated if only over an extended period of time.
For example, Farnham v. Fingold57 involved an agreement for sale of a
company where a premium had been paid to controlling shareholders but
had not been offered to the others. As a result, suit was initiated on behalf
of the shareholders who were not part of the control group seeking damages,
a declaration, and an accounting. The Court rejected any suggestion that
because the relief, at least in some aspects, involved damages, that in itself
was enough to disentitle the suit as a class action. But the Court, again
echoing Markt, was troubled because individual proceedings might be nec-
essary and it was uncertain how various aspects such as discovery and costs
should be dealt with.58 However, the Court did not have to decide these
issues because it was satisfied that no individual proceedings would be
necessary. The damages claimed were the "gross premium" over the market
price received by the controlling group and the Court was satisfied that such
damages could be ascertained as a common question and that the individual
entitlements of class members could be determined without the participation
of the defendants.5 9 In a subsequent case involving a disgruntled class of
subscribers to a magazine, 60 the Court also accepted arguments that separate
contracts were not a bar to class actions. The Court did not have to face
the individual damages/separate proceedings issue because it also held that
damages to class members could be determined by applying an arithmetical
formula.
But it was in the 1978 case of Naken v. General Motors of Canada6l that
the Ontario courts had to undertake their most extensive examination of
55. Id. at 452, 2 W.W.R. at 490.
56. Unpublished Order of McIntyre, J., (December 28, 1972) quoted in I OLRC REPORT,
supra note 27, at 27.
57. 33 D.L.R.3d 156, 2 O.R. 132 (C.A. 1973).
58. Id. at 160, 2 O.R. at 136.
59. Id. at 161, 2 O.R. at 137.
60. Cobbold v. TIME Can. Ltd., 71 D.L.R.3d 629, 13 O.R.2d 567 (H.C.J. 1976). The
action was dismissed at trial. See 109 D.L.R.3d 611, 28 O.R.2d 326 (H.C.J. 1980); see also
Alberta Pork Producers' Mktg. Bd. v. Swift Can. Co., 129 D.L.R.3d 411, 33 A.R. 541 (Q.B.
1981), aff'd, 9 D.L.R.4th 71 (C.A. 1981).
61. 92 D.L.R.3d 100, 21 O.R.2d 780 (1978).
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class actions to that point. There the plaintiff sued to represent individuals
who purchased new models of a car manufactured or distributed by the
defendant in 1971 and 1972. The plaintiffs argued that the sale of the cars
breached a collateral warranty of the defendant resulting in each class mem-
ber sustaining $1,000 in damages because of the reduced resale value of the
cars.
Because the same damages were claimed for each individual, a separate
stage for ascertaining damages would not have been necessary and thus the
claim for damages presented no obstacle. However, it was argued by the
defendant that, as a matter of substantive law, each member of the class
would have to prove reliance on the warranty in order to recover any damages
resulting from its breach. The Court accepted that such proceedings might
be necessary but, subject to some modifications, was willing to allow the
action to continue,62 even while urging that class actions be examined care-
fully by the Ontario Law Reform Commission (then studying the question)
to ascertain whether comprehensive legislative reform was warranted. 63 What
is striking is the willingness of the Court to take some risks rather than
deny the claimants an opportunity to assert their claim:
Undoubtedly the plaintiffs face many procedural and evidentiary dif-
ficulties if this action is allowed to proceed. If we are to have consumer
class actions in Ontario it would be highly desirable that there be enacted
legislation or rules of practice or both, pursuant to which such actions
could be conducted. I am not persuaded that it is impossible to carry
such an action to completion even now, although the reference following
judgment would certainly require all of the innovation [of some American
courts] .64
This openness towards the evolving class suit and adopting it as a vehicle
for mass actions was indeed frail and halting and there were signs of back-
sliding by other courts.6 Yet such an attitude did demonstrate the willingness
of some Canadian judges to at least begin an inquiry into the proper methods
for courts to handle the widespread problems that are inevitable in the
industrialized and regulated twentieth century. But all this came to an abrupt
halt when Naken reached the Supreme Court of Canada.
62. Id. at 115-16, 21 O.R. at 794-96.
63. Id. at 104-05, 21 O.R. at 785-86.
64. Id. at 113, 21 O.R. at 793-94.
65. See, e.g., Loader v. Rose Park Wellesley Invs., 114 D.L.R.3d 105, 29 O.R.2d 381
(H.C.J. 1980); Stephenson v. Air Can., 103 D.L.R.3d 148, 26 O.R.2d 369 (H.C.J. 1979), aff'd
unreported, Feb. 10, 1981, Ont. C.A.; Seafarers Int'l Union of Can. v. Lawrence, 97 D.L.R.3d
324, 24 O.R.2d 257 (C.A. 1979); United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing
& Pipefitting Indus. of the U.S. & Can., Local 488 v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 97
D.L.R.3d 56, 17 A.R. 396 (Alta. S.C.T.D. 1979); Goodfellow v. Knight, 5 A.R. 573, 2 C.P.C.
209 (Alta. S.C.T.D. 1977).
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C. Naken and the Supreme Court: Evolution Denied
The decision of the Supreme Court in Naken6 has been excoriated. 67
Articles have been devoted to demonstrating how bad the unanimous decision
written by Mr. Justice Estey is simply from a technical standpoint and how
misstatements concerning the antecedent English and Canadian case law and
American class action provisions and decisions call into question the basic
premise upon which the decision rests.68 Yet, in my view, there are even
more fundamental problems which need to be discussed, so one example of
these errors will suffice here.
The Court judged that individual proceedings were necessary and that
since the rule applying to class actions did not expressly address separate
procedures the class action must, on that account, be prohibited. To buttress
his views, Mr. Justice Estey pointed to, among other things, Rule 328 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure and its interpretation by that state's
Supreme Court.6 9 He concluded that the Court "appears reluctant to go
much beyond the law as we read it in Markt. "70
In fact California courts, at least in the decisions Mr. Justice Estey cites, have
been very innovative in dealing with procedural issues of the sort faced by
the Court in Naken. The well-known case of Vasquez v. Superior Court of
San Joaquin County1 is referred to in aid of establishing that a class action
which would require individual proceedings to determine specific members'
rights is illegitimate. But this is a distortion. What Vasquez did do was rule
that "numerous and substantial questions to determine [each member's] right
to recover ' 72 could prevent a class action from proceeding but this is very
different from suggesting that individual issues must always prohibit class
litigation.
There is even more irony in the Court citing Vasquez since there was a
direct parallel between the issues in the two cases which is ignored by Naken.73
66. 144 D.L.R.3d 385, 1 S.C.R. 72, 46 N.R. 139 (1983) (subsequent references are to 144
D.L.R.3d 385).
67. See Bankier, supra note 41; Bogart, Naken, The Supreme Court and What Are Our
Courts For, 9 C.B.L.J. 280 (1984); Fox, Naken v. General Motors of Canada: Class Actions
Deferred, 6 Sup. Cr. L. Rv. 335 (1984); Prichard, Class Actions Reform: Some General
Comments, 9 C.B.L.J. 309, 311 (1984) ("Naken is a bad decision in every sense of the word:
bad as a matter of interpreting Rule 75; bad as a matter of understanding the case law of the
past decade concerning class actions, bad as a matter of judicial craftsmanship; bad as a matter
of being a further example of judicial formalism and conservatism; bad as a matter of an
appreciation of the judicial role; and bad as a matter of public policy.").
68. See Fox, supra note 67, at 352-67; Bankier, supra note 41, at 284-96 (detailing the
various mistakes and errors in the judgment).
69. See Fox, supra note 67, at 359-67 (dealing with the Court's misinterpretation in detail).
70. Naken, 144 D.L.R.3d at 400.
71. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
72. Id. at 809, 484 P.2d at 969, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
73. See Fox, supra note 67, at 361.
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In Vasquez. the class was purchasers of food freezers who, it was alleged,
were victims of the defendant vendor's fraudulent misrepresentation. The
defendant, as in Naken, sought to have the class action stopped because
each class member would have to prove reliance on the misrepresentation.
The California court not only held that the class action was proper, but it
went further and suggested that if it could be established that the misre-
presentation had been directed to the class, the court could infer reliance,
thus eliminating separate proceedings to establish it for each claim. In man-
gling the cases of a state whose approach has been described as showing
the "utmost liberality, ' 74 Mr. Justice Estey seriously undercut his attempts
to establish the impropriety of class actions in similar circumstances.
Most disturbing is the fact that the Court ignored the changing attitude
of lower courts toward class actions in the 1970's and 1980's and shrouded
its own analysis in unrepentant formalism: "The sole duty of the court is
to ascertain the proper interpretation by the application of the canons of
construction to the words adopted by the maker of the rule and its application
to these proceedings. ' 75 It is understandable that the text of the Rule76 should
guide determination of the appropriateness of any class action. But the error
is to decide that since various procedures are not explicitly addressed by the
Rule those procedures must be straight-jacketed. 77 The Court says nothing
about the fact that the Rule was drafted over 100 years ago and that there
is plenty of evidence to suggest that courts before and after did not regard
it as an exhaustive code but simply a general statement concerning procedures
which were to be flexible and evolving. 7
74. Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 CoLum. L. Rav. 609, 617
(1971).
75. Naken, 144 D.L.R.3d at 408. Earlier, Mr. Justice Estey observed:
The virtue and benefit of the institution of the class action is not here on trial;
only the availability of that kind of proceeding in the circumstances of this case.
Neither is this issue to be resolved on the basis of weighing the advantages of
the representative action for the plaintiff and the disadvantages of such an action
for the defendant (although a study of these factors may assist in the process)
but rather on the basis of the correct interpretation of this rule of court and its
application to the circumstances of the parties to this action.
Id. at 387. "
76. The Ontario Rule governing class actions when Naken was decided was Rule 75. In
1984 the Ontario rules of court were reformed (see supra note 33) but aside from being assigned
a new number (12) the rule relating to class actions was not significantly altered.
77. Mr. Justice Estey wrote:
It seems clear to me that the purpose of Rule 75 was not to impose upon the
general pattern of procedure established by all the Rules of Court a new and
distinct method of proceeding which does not fit into the provisions already made
for the conduct of actions in the Supreme Court. If such were the case, we would
expect to find in the rules extensive provisions supporting the conduct of such a
novel claim now said to have been created by Rule 75.
Naken, 144 D.L.R.3d at 409.
78. See Fox, supra note 67, at 357-58 (documenting the Court's failure to distinguish earlier
English cases which suggested the English rule should be treated flexibly and interpreted in
light of the liberal rules that preceded it).
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At bottom Mr. Justice Estey's critique zeroes in on the need for separate
proceedings to resolve issues of reliance by individual members on the defend-
ant's warranty and on two objections to such procedures. Firstly, although
he acknowledges it would be possible to do so, he believes that allowing
masters (court officials who assist judges by hearing various pre- and post-
trial motions) to resolve the individual questions would be inappropriate.
Secondly, returning to the objection articulated in older cases, he focuses
on the absence in the Rule of explicit provisions to deal with aspects of the
individual proceedings such as discovery and the responsibility of class mem-
bers for costs.
There are specific replies to the Court's insistence that the meager text of
the Rule necessitated its hobbling such litigation. Firstly, the Court indicated
that, since proceedings for resolving individual issues have been addressed
in detail in the United States, this demonstrates that courts should not go
about constructing means for dealing with these issues. 79 It is certainly true
that the American legislative provisions mentioned by the Court in Federal
Rule 23 and the Uniform Class Actions Act are much more detailed than
Rule 75, addressing many issues which Rule 75 ignored. However, one issue
which the American rules do not address, other than indicating such pro-
cedures are legitimate, 0 is the means of resolving questions relating to
individual class members. Thus any development of such procedures has
been the result of judicial initiative, the very point Mr. Justice Estey was
seeking to resist.
Secondly, the Supreme Court suggested that referring the procedures for
resolving individual questions to a master would be wrong because, under
the established practice, a judge would only review the master's report of
any procedures which he or she had conducted and, therefore, would not
have the opportunity to see "the witnesses examined under examination and
cross-examination." 8' This is a strange remark because such a reference is
a means for the court to delegate the hearing of issues to someone else and
therefore, by definition, it means that the delegating court itself is not meant
to conduct the detailed hearing. Moreover; the rules regarding references
contemplate flexibility in framing the process needed to deal with any
particular issue-including viva voce examination if required.12 The kinds of
79. Naken, 144 D.L.R.3d at 397-98.
80. Federal Rule 23, for example, provides only that "an action may be brought or main-
tained as a class action with respect to particular issues." FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(4)(a).
81. Naken, 144 D.L.R.3d at 406.
82. Rule 425 of the Ontario rules, in effect when Naken was decided, stated:
In giving directions and in regulating the manner of proceeding before him,
the Master shall devise and adopt the simplest, most speedy and least expensive
method of prosecuting the reference, and with that view may dispense with any
proceeding ordinarily taken which he conceives to be unnecessary or substitute a
different course of proceeding for that ordinarily taken.
R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 540.
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issues in Naken and many class actions will raise repetitive questions and
will involve comparatively small amounts of money for the individual plain-
tiff and, therefore, seem to be an example of the very kind of problem that
the rules anticipate will be handled by references. 3 And even if we agreed
that masters should not deal with individual proceedings, that would simply
lead to the suggestion that judges should hear the specific issues. This might,
at times, be a drain on judicial resources but it is not a reason, by itself,
to deny these kinds of class actions.
Thirdly, the Court overstated its suggestion that the Rules of Court made
no provision for procedures for discovery and costs regarding absentee class
members. The Rules do, in the main, deal with the rights and duties of
parties to a lawsuit. But even a technical reading of the Rules could allow
them to deal with the position of absentee class members by treating those
members as parties since there is nothing in the Rules which would forbid
thisA4 In addition, Rule 1 of the Rules, then, in effect indicated that anal-
ogous reasoning was to be used to cover matters not explicitly addressed."5
Further, the Court could have drawn on its own basic notions of procedural
fairness to deal with outstanding issues like discovery and costs.8 6 Had it
concluded, for example, that some form of discovery was necessary against
specific members when dealing with individual questions and that they should
be exposed to some liability for costs if they lost, it would not be a significant
departure to treat them as parties for the purpose of individual proceedings
and to make them liable to discovery and for payment of costs should they
be unsuccessful in the resolution of their specific individual questions.
But the Court seemed completely unwilling to engage in any analysis which
directly faced the reasons why this litigation ought to be accommodated or
why it should by shunned. Only once did Mr. Justice Estey recognize the
need for class actions and the consequences of not allowing the action to
proceed. Yet even here the Court claimed that these needs had to be answered
not by judicial but rather by legislative reform:
[T]he cost of demonstration of the violation of the alleged unilateral
contract by engineering, market and other evidence with reference to
damages suffered, would be extensive and expensive.... If the court
were now to find that these claims may not be processed under Rule 75
83. See Bogart, supra note 67, at 298-99.
84. The then Judicature Act, empowering the rules of court to be made, stated in § 1(0)
that party "includes a person served with notice of or attending a proceeding, although not
named on the record." R.S.O. 1980, ch. 223 (emphasis added).
85. R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 540, Rule 1 stated, "[a]s to all matters not provided for in these
rules, the practice shall be regulated by analogy thereto."
86. Indeed, the courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada, have repeatedly drawn on
their version of what constitutes basic procedural fairness to supervise proceedings conducted
by administrative agencies and actors. See, e.g., Macdonald, Judicial Review and Procedural
Fairness in Administrative Law, 25 McGiL L.J. 520 (1979-80); Macdonald, Judicial Review
and Procedural Fairness in Administrative Law: II, 26 McGm.L L.J. 1 (1981).
['Vol. 62:665
CLASS ACTIONS IN CANADA
it may mean, in practical terms, the end to many claims which, math-
ematically at least, may amount to about five million dollars. Further-
more, having regard to the practices in the modem market-place
particularly, in national merchandizing of products such as automobiles,
it is not an unreasonable risk that the vendor undertakes if he is now
found to be exposed to class actions by dissatisfied purchasers.... These,
of course, are matters of policy more fittingly the subject of scrutiny in
the legislative rather than the judicial chamber.,
Thus, Canada's highest court turned away from an opportunity to continue
the development of class actions which had been going on in the courts of
the provinces in the 1970's and 1980's, a process of incremental change
which even conservative legal commentators acknowledge as a legitimate role
for Canadian courts."
A number of subsequent decisions from lower courts indicate a willingness
to follow Naken without struggle. 9 Interestingly, however, others have not
been enthusiastic in reacting to Mr. Justice Estey's decision. Some have been
able to characterize the issues in the actions before them as involving no
individual issues, thus escaping the otherwise broad sweep of Naken.9° In
one instance, the court read the applicable statute as authorizing a class
action brought by a public official even if individual issues would surface. 91
And in another 92 the judge clung tenaciously to slight differences in wording
of the applicable rule93 to distinguish Naken and to permit an action for
defamation of a group even though assessment of individual damages seemed
a distinct possibility. 94
87. Naken, 144 D.L.R.3d at 408.
88. See, e.g., Devlin, Judges and Lawmakers, 1976 MOD. L. RIv. 1, 8-11.
89. See, e.g., Morgan v. Superintendent of the Winnipeg Remand Centre, 36 C.P.C. 266
(Man. Q.B. 1983); Canning v. Governing Council of the Univ. of Toronto, 46 C.P.C. 165
(Ont. H.C. 1984).
90. See, e.g., Alberta Pork Producers Mktg. Bd. v. Swift Can. Co., 53 A.R. 284 (Alta.
C.A. 1984); Bradley & Forsyth v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, 31 Sask. R. 254 (Q.B. 1984).
91. Sparling v. Royal Trustco Ltd., 45 O.R.2d 484 (C.A. 1984). Here the Director appointed
pursuant to the Canada Business Corporations Act 1974-75-76 (Can.), ch. 33, § 253, commenced
an action alleging that the defendant directors and company were in breach of the requirements
of the Act with respect to takeover bids and claimed a declaration of liability and a reference
to the Master to determine the entitlement of the individual shareholders. In allowing the action
the Court's attitude was in marked contrast to that of Mr. Justice Estey in Naken:
Where a statute provides a remedy, its scope should not be unduly restricted.
Rather, the Courts should seek to provide the means to effect that remedy ....
In this action, the class is reasonably clearly defined. It will be open to the
presiding judge to give all the necessary directions to make such further inquiries
he may deem just and appropriate at the conclusion of the action assuming that
the plaintiff is successful.
Id. at 497.
92. Lumney v. Agostini, 47 A.R. 385 (1983).
93. The difference which the Court focused upon was that the applicable rule, Rule 42 of
the Alberta Rules of Court, refers to "a common interest" as opposed to the Ontario wording
of "[p]ersons having the same interest." Lumney, 47 A.R. at 388.
94. Id.
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Finally, the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Ranjoy Sales and Leasing v.
Deloitte Haskins & Sells,95 interpreting a rule identical to the one that was
the subject of the Naken decision,9 allowed a class action in the face of
what it acknowledged could be a wide array of issues that would not be
common to the class including ones involving reliance, the very issue in
Naken. There the plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of creditors of
bankrupt companies claiming the defendants negligently prepared audited
financial statements which were relied upon by the plaintiffs, inducing them
to loan money to the companies which subsequently went bankrupt. The
Court acknowledged there would be issues involving reliance, for example,
whether at least some class members could be deemed to have relied on the
financial statements, particularly since different deficiencies were alleged in
the statements over four years which might very well not be common to all
the class. The Court, nevertheless, was prepared to allow the action to
proceed. What the Court did do was impose a kind of reverse onus, allowing
the action to go ahead as a class suit and providing an opportunity "to
redefine the class to exclude any person where there is evidence, either at
trial or before, that indicates that such a person may be prejudiced if included
in the class." 97 This is all vague since the Court never indicates what will
constitute "prejudice." What the Court's maneuverings did do was finesse
individual issues as a bar to class actions-an approach open to criticism
for lack of candor but understandable perhaps given the range of reasons
in Naken.
Thus, several courts of the provinces seem prepared to distinguish Naken
whenever possible in acknowledgment of the need for class actions. But such
sidestepping can only do so much and Naken remains a formidable obstacle
not only for what it says but also because it deflects attention away from
other important questions such as financing class litigation, fairness to ab-
sentee members, and important procedural matters such as discovery and
the appropriate means to assess and distribute monetary relief. So the stage
is indeed set for legislative overhaul.
II. LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES
Although there have been other attempts to achieve legislative reform of
class actions, 9 the experiences in Quebec and Ontario call for careful ex-
95. 31 Man. R.2d 87 (1984).
96. Manitoba Queen's Bench Rule 58.
97. Ranjoy, 31 Man. R.2d at 93.
98. See I NEw BRUNSWICK DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, LAW REFoRM DivisIoN, TmRD REPORT
OraH CONSUMER PRom cTIoN PRomEcr (1976). There were various attempts to include provisions
for class actions in the federal legislation overhauling competition law. See An Act to Amend
the Combines Investigation Act, Bill C-42 (30th Parl., 2d Sess. 1977); An Act to Amend the
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amination. Quebec passed detailed legislation some eight years ago and in
1982 the influential Ontario Law Reform Commission issued a lengthy report
and draft act calling for substantial overhaul of class actions. Both the
Quebec Act and the Ontario Law Reform Commission's proposals have been
the subject of active commentary by supporters and detractors alike.
A. Quebec
Quebec is Canada's French speaking province and its law has been influ-
enced very much by the civil law system. Nevertheless, the Quebec legal
culture has also been exposed to pressures for enhanced access to the courts
and for righting the imbalance between individuals and aggregates. When
class action legislation was enacted by the reformist (and potentially sepa-
ratist) Parti Qu6becois government in 1978 it was said to be a substantial
step for social change.9 The two aspects of the Quebec procedures0 which
are most prominent are the provision for a broadened scope for class actions
heavily influenced by United States Federal Rule 23 and the use of public
funding in an attempt to remove cost disincentives to this kind of litigation.10'
The Quebec Act requires court authorization for litigation to proceed as
a class action and such approval is given based on a number of criteria, 1' 2
exhibiting an obvious parallel with United States Federal Rule 23. The factors
are: the presence of "identical, similar or related" questions of law or fact; 0 3
"the facts alleged appear to justify the conclusions sought""°4-intended to
be a mild merits test and to that extent departing from Rule 23 provisions;
other methods of proceedings are difficult or impractical; 05 and, the class
representative will adequately represent its members.4 6
Combines Investigation Act, Bill C-13 (30th Parl., 3d Sess. 1977); N. WILLAMS & J. WHYBRow,
A PROPOSAL FOR CLASS ACTIONS UNDER COMPETITIoN PoLIcY LEGISLATION (1976). Legislation
was finally passed in 1986 without a provision for class actions. See An Act to Establish the
Competition Tribunal and to Amend the Combines Investigation Act and the Bank Act and
Other Acts in Consequence Thereof (33rd Pan., 1st Sess. 1986) (33-34-35 Eliz. II, 1984-85-86,
passed June 5, 1986).
99. Debats de 'Assemble nationale, 3ieme session, 3ieme legislature, vol. 20, 2064, 2066.
100. Act respecting the class action, Que. Stat. ch. 8 (1978). The class action provisions are
now part of the CODE OF CrvI PROCEDURE.
101. The summary of the provisions relies heavily on Glenn, Class Actions in Ontario andQuebec, 62 CAN. BAR. Ray. 247, 253 (1984) and I OLRC REPORT, supra note 27, at 70.
102. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, arts. 1002, 1003.
103. Id. at art. 1003(a).
104. Id. at art. 1003(b). The Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that article 1003(b)
may be used for minimal scrutiny of the merits of the action. See Le Comite Regional des
Usagers des Transports en Commun de Quebec c. La Commission des Transports de la Com-
munaute Urbane de Quebec, 37 N.R. 608 (S.C.C. 1981). See also Bogart, Class Actions, The
Court and Commentators, 3 Sup. CT. L. Rav. 426 (1982).
105. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, art. 1003(c).
106. Id. at art. 1003(d).
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The court, like its American counterpart, is given wide managerial powers
throughout the litigation to take measures to hasten the progress of the
action, to simplify proof and to give notice to members of the class when
to do so will preserve their rights. 1°7 Members of the class who do not wish
to be bound may opt out as of right. 08 If the action is successful on the
common questions, the court is able to order a number of forms of monetary
relief including payments to class members based on an aggregate assessment
of damages,'09 cy-pr~s distribution if distribution to individual members is
impracticable or onerous," 0 awards based on individual assessment of
damages"' and other kinds of remedies." 2 Initially the Act conferred appeal
rights on both sides from orders made at the authorization stage and from
final judgment." 3 And to clarify at least some of the issues concerning who
might be an appropriate representative, non-profit corporations and em-
ployee associations were given explicit but qualified rights to act as class
representatives." 4
Any plaintiff contemplating a class action must face two problems in
respect to costs: first, under Canadian costs rules she will have to pay the
defendant's costs if she loses; and, second, she will have to arrange payment
of her own lawyer's costs. The Quebec Act retained the rule that the un-
successful party should generally pay the winner's costs."' However, the
other disincentive to class actions, the funding of the litigation and payment
of the class lawyer, was addressed through public funding and by creating
an administrative agency charged with assessing and funding class initiatives,
the Fonds d'aide aux recours collectifs." 6 The application to the Fonds may
request payment of lawyer's fees, experts' fees, and court costs including
the costs of notice and other expenses. The Fonds decides whether to grant
aid based on whether the action may be brought or continued if such aid
is not forthcoming. If a class action has not been authorized at the time of
the application, the Fonds also decides whether it is probable that there is
a valid cause of action and the probability that the class action will be
allowed. If the class representative or her lawyer receive amounts as fees,
costs, or expenses from a third party, those amounts are to be reimbursed
to the Fonds to the extent financial assistance was provided. If the Fonds
107. Id. at art. 1045.
108. Id. at art. 1007.
109. Id. at arts. 1031-33.
110. Id. at art. 1034.
111. Id. at arts. 1037-40.
112. Id. at art. 1032.
113. Id. at art. 1010.
114. Id. at art. 1048.
115. Id. at art. 477.
116. An Act respecting the class action, QuE. Ray. STAT. ch. R-2.1, art. 545, as amended
by Que. Stat., ch. 37, art. 25 (1982).
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refuses an application for assistance there are provisions for an appeal to a
court. 1
17
In 1982, amendments were passed to address certain problems which had
arisen."8 As a result, cooperatives can be class representatives and the re-
quirement that at least one member of the represented class had to be a
member of the organization at the time the cause of action arose was
repealed. Therefore, a non-profit corporation-for example, a consumer
protection association-can sue representing a class whose members have
joined the association after the circumstances giving rise to the litigation. 119
Because there was dissatisfaction concerning the length of time consumed
in processing class actions, the appeals from orders dealing with class au-
thorization were changed. Immediate appeals as of right by defendants from
orders authorizing class actions were ended; only orders refusing authori-
zation are now susceptible to an immediate right of appeal. 120
Though the issue of funding of class actions was addressed in the original
legislation through the creation of the Fonds d'aide aux recours collectifs,
the exposure of the plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs was retained, thus
leaving a significant disincentive in place, since a class representative could
still be responsible to the defendant for very substantial amounts in the
event of an unsuccessful suit. However, the amendments of 1982, while
retaining the two-way costs rule, greatly reduced the potential exposure for
plaintiffs. A generally applicable rule in Quebec which charged the loser
with paying one percent of the amount in question for cases exceeding
$100,000 was made inapplicable to class actions.' 2' Further, costs in class
actions are now determined by reference to the tariff of costs which applies
to actions involving amounts of $1,000 to $3,000 regardless of the amount
actually in issue.'2 Finally, the Fonds was empowered to authorize funding
not only on a year-to-year basis, as in the original Act, but to grant funds
on a continuing basis throughout the litigation.'2
Statistics compiled to 1983124 show that the number of class
actions filed annually was about .04% of all civil cases (20 out of
117. Id. at art. 35.
118. Supra note 116.
119. 1982 Que. Stat. ch. 37, art. 23, amending art. 1048, CODE OF CWvM PROCEDURE.
120. 1982 Que. Stat. ch. 37, art. 22, amending art. 1010, CODE OF Crvm PROCEDURE.
121. 1982 Que. Stat. ch. 37, art. 24, enacting art. 1050.1, CODE OF Crvu PROCEDURE.
122. Id.
123. 1982 Que. Stat. ch. 37, art. 25, amending arts. 43 and 44 of An Act respecting the
class action, supra note 100.
124. In fact I have obtained, through the assistance of M. Yves Lauzon, Director General
of the Fonds, statistics current to September 24, 1986. They reflect a pattern very similar to
those established in 1983. In order to facilitate comparison with the points made by Glenn and
Lauzon in this section, the 1983 statistics will be referred to. The statistics to September 24,
1986 are on file with the author at the University of Windsor.
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55,000),"25 much less than the 1%70 of civil cases which had been predicted
at the time of the passing of the legislation."-6 Of the cases which had been
filed for authorization by the Superior Court, 28 were granted, 39 were
denied, 19 resulted in withdrawal, 4 never proceeded, 5 were settled out of
court, 2 requests were waiting judgment from the Court, 1 was being ne-
gotiated and 12 were proceeding to be heard. Of the 8 cases which had been
litigated on the merits, 7 decisions were in favor of the class.1 27
Different explanations for and conclusions about these statistics emerge,
depending on a larger view of the desirability of class actions. For example,
proponents tend to point to the complexity of the authorization process and
a cautious judiciary to explain what might be seen as an unsatisfactory level
of authorizations.2 8 Critics, on the other hand, point to the discrepancy
between the number of class actions predicted and the number filed, the
percentage which have been refused authorization, and the number which
have been withdrawn (although the reason for withdrawal is not clear) as
an indication that class actions are not likely to prove the agent of social
reform that they were expected to be. 29
However, one commentator's criticism of class actions in Quebec-and
their prospects in Canada generally-is tied to what he thinks is, and should
be, a systemic hostility towards this form of litigation. Professor Glenn
believes that class actions as a vehicle for collective litigation must fail because
they run afoul of the essence of the judicial function in the adversarial
system. 30 He seems particularly concerned by the burdens he perceives class
actions will impose 31 and that, in resolving issues for the class on the common
questions, courts will somehow confer judgment on the class without taking
account of the issues individual to class members which may be critical to
deciding whether or not any particular member ought to recover:
The judiciary thus is requested to act on behalf of people who have
not requested judicial intervention, to give judgment in the absence of
proof of the requisite elements of each class member's claim, to thereby
presume commonality in the sense of general though unproved charac-
125. Glenn, supra note 101, at 255 nn.60-61, draws on statistics provided in the Fonds d'aide
aux recours collectifs Rapports Annuels and the Gouvernement du Quebec, Ministere de Ia
Justice, Rapports Annuels.
126. Andre Sirois, Un fonds d'aide de 100,000 dollars (1979), 1 (no. 2) Justice 22. Cases
brought under the Act to 1985 are collected and discussed in Ducharme & Lauzon, Le Recours
Collectif, (Barreau du Quebec, Formation Permanente, no date).
127. Lauzon, Le Recours Collectif Quebecois: Description et Bilan, 9 C.B.L.J. 324, 336-37
(1984).
128. Id. at 345-46.
129. Glenn, supra note 101, at 255.
130. Id. at 264. ("The judiciary (particularly the elitist one of the common law tradition) is
thus not a force of police, and the entire corpus of civil or private law is revealed, through
the nature of its enforcement mechanism, as an optional device for acute conflict resolution.");
see also Glenn, The Dilemma of Class Action Reform, 6 OXFoRD J. LEO. StrD. 262 (1986).
131. Glenn, supra note 101, at 265-67.
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teristics, and to issue orders necessarily requiring further adjudication
for purposes of implementation. This is of course a description not of
judicial decision-making in the traditional sense, but of legislation, the
creation, often at some interested party's initiative, of general norms
applicable to generically described groups of varying dimension and
necessitating further structures of implementation or adjudication.1 2
Such a celebration of the classical paradigm of litigation can be responded
to at several levels. First, the charge that class actions are unduly burdensome
is very complex and Professor Glenn makes it without due attention to the
studies which have attempted to assess the relevant questions. Careful com-
parisons of class with non-class actions suggest that in some contexts and
for some substantive areas class actions may indeed be more burdensome.'33
However, other studies suggest that there is no significant difference in
judicial time employed to hear class and non-class cases 3 4 and that there is
a basis for suggesting that any additional judicial time class actions may
consume is outweighed by their capacity to generate more substantial amounts
of relief.' 3 The point here is to emphasize that any view of class actions
which falls to sift through the many relevant studies is open to serious
question.
Second, the lower level of filing than predicted in Quebec is a strange
criticism since class actions initially had to fight allegations that they would
flood the courts. 136 Class actions have also declined in the United States
during this period but several explanations have been offered which call into
question the supposition that this form of litigation is unsuited to our court
system. Prominent among these is the suggestion that class actions often are
filed as a response to some government litigation or investigation which
unearths the cause of action and the evidence to establish it.1a 7 When such
activity declines, so too can class actions.'38 A similar explanation could
account for a lower rate of class actions in Quebec, There is no indication
of the extent to which any of these class actions have had the benefit of
prior government investigation or the extent to which original predictions
concerning the volume of class actions contemplated were related to gov-
ernment investigation or litigation.
132. Id. at 270-71 (emphasis in original).
133. See DuVal, The Class Action as an Antitrust Enforcement Device: The Chicago Study
Revisited, 1979 ABF REs. J. 449, discussed in DuVal, Review (1983), 3 WwnDsoR Y.B. AccEss
JusT. 411, 427 n.35.
134. See DuVal, Review, supra note 133, at 426 (discussing Flanders, The 1979 Federal
District Court Time Study (Federal Judicial Center, 1980)).
135. Bernstein, Judicial Economy and Class Actions, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1978).
136. I OLRC REPORT, supra note 27, at 169.
137. See Garth, Studying Civil Litigation Through the Class Action, 62 IND. L.J. 497 (1987);
source cited id. at 501, n.16.
138. Id.
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Third, when Professor Glenn worries that courts will collapse individual
questions and common questions, thus giving judgment to plaintiffs when
they would not otherwise have succeeded, he points to no cases either in
Quebec or the United States in which this has actually occurred. Indeed, he
has pointed to a certain judicial hostility in America towards class actions
for mass torts. 139 That courts should reject such claims as candidates for
class actions is open to serious question"4' but it hardly suggests that courts
are embracing the problem he fears.
Finally, his arguments that the essence of the judicial function demands
rejection of class actions seem wrong-headed in two ways. First, research
into what courts have historically done suggests that they have been much
more intrusive and active than accords with the paradigm he has described . 4'
Such common matters as default judgments, long-arm provisions, prejudg-
ment remedies and levy and execution all have involved the courts in per-
sisting in forcing obstinate litigants to obey.'4 2 Again, common procedures
in probate cases or bankruptcy and receivership matters show how courts
can be involved in extensive, sometimes complex, and prolonged tasks which
involve their ongoing involvement and supervision. 143 Second, his description
takes no account of the radical transformation which has occurred in society
in this century. The social structure has been transformed by the growth of
aggregates of power such as corporations, government, and unions."'" It is
these aggregates and the consequences of their actions which are the root
of the need for change in decision making forms over time. What will call
courts' legitimacy into question is an insistence upon immutable forms of
dispute resolution shaped by very different social forces and needs many
years ago.
B. The Ontario Law Reform Commission: Report on Class
Actions
Individualism, the belief in the free and independent action of indi-
viduals, is a concept that has deep roots in Western Society.
139. Glenn, Class Actions and the Theory of Tort and Delict, 35 U. ToRoNTo L.J. 287
(1985).
140. See Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective
Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987).
141. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation,
93 HAgv. L. Rlv. 465 (1980); Bogart, "Appropriate and Just": Section 24 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Question of Judicial Legitimacy, 10 DAmnousi L.J.
81 (1986).
142. Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 141, at 481.
143. Id. at 481.
144. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HALv. L.
REv. 1, 36 (1979).
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In the past, we generally have accepted as fair and reasonable the
often heavy burden of ultimately vindicating our rights by the com-
mencement of individual legal proceedings.
Not surprisingly, it is the development of a highly complex, interde-
pendent society that has impeded the capacity of each person to vindicate
his legal rights.... Inevitably, dramatic changes in production, pro-
motion and consumption have given rise to what may be called "mass
wrongs"-that is, injury or damage to many persons caused by the same
or very similar sets of circumstances.
... And in the wake of such misconduct, the individual is very often
unable or unwilling to stand alone in meaningful opposition.'14
So begins the Ontario Law Reform Commission's 1982 Report on Class
Actions.'46 Praised for in comprehensiveness and insightful treatment 47 but
criticized for its alleged radicalism, 14 the nine-hundred page document in-
vestigates the problems which class actions address, assesses the case for
reform to implement this litigation and makes detailed recommendations for
reform, including a lengthy draft act. It is a principal point of departure
for those interested in these lawsuits and the issues surrounding them.
In constructing its recommendations the Commission endorsed three effects
of class actions. The first effect is the relatively uncontroversial one of
judicial economy; that is, class actions can avoid duplicative and expensive
procedures where a number of similar claims would be brought, in any event,
because they are economically rational on an individual basis. 49 Second,
they can address certain barriers-social, psychological and economic-which
otherwise prevents claims from being brought. This is somewhat more of
an issue since, by definition, some defendants will be exposed to actions
that they would otherwise have avoided.5 0 Third, and most controversially,
the Commission accepted behavior modification, that is, "the potential of
class actions to provide the incentives for increased compliance with the law,
145. I OLRC REPORT, supra note 27, at 2-3. I was a consultant to the Commission for its
Report. While I am clearly supportive of the Report generally, the Commission's recommen-
dations and my views of class actions are obviously separate matters.
146. Id.
147. DuVal, Class Actions, supra note 133, at 411: "The Ontario Law Reform Commission's
Report on Class Actions is an important contribution to the literature on class actions. It
belongs on the bookshelf of anyone with a serious interest in the topic whether they reside to
the north or to the south of the Canadian border." See also Prichard, supra note 67; Cromwell,
An Examination of the Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Class Actions, 15 OTTAWA
L. REv. 587 (1983).
148. See Macdonald & Rowley, Ontario Class Action Reform: Business and Justice System
Impacts-A Comment, 9 C.B.L.J. 351 (1984); see also REPORT ON CLASS AcrloNs-SrMssIoN
TO THE HON. R. RoY McMuRmY, Q.C. ATroRNEY GENERAL OF ONrrauo BY THE CANADIAN
BAR AssociAToN (ONTAIuO) AND TnE PUBLiC INTEREST REsEARCH CENTRE (1983).
149. I OLRC REPORT, supra note 27, at 118-19.
150. Id. at 119-39.
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through the prevention of unjust enrichment or cost internalization .... 151
Five areas of the Report and its conclusions illustrate how it tackled issues
surrounding this kind of litigation and in what ways it resembles and differs
from provisions under Federal Rule 23.152 First the Commission, in a pro-
vision parallel to Rule 23, recommended a certification process by which the
court would rule on the appropriateness of the class action procedure early
in the action. The Commission did approve some tests which came directly
from the American Rule: numerosity, adequacy of representation, the ex-
istence of common issues of fact or law, and superiority of the class action
to other means of affording relief. However, some important differences
exist in the tests. For example, the issue of whether common questions
predominate over those which are specific to individual members of the class
is not a separate test, but is instead one of the factors employed to gauge
whether the class action is superior. 153
Further, American courts have often treated "superiority" and "predom-
inance" as interchangeable bases for rejecting class actions judged to be
unmanageable even if to do so would mean that no redress would be
possible. 154 But the Commission recommended a two-level means of ap-
proaching such issues. First, the court is to compare the class action with
"other available methods for the fair and efficient resolution of the con-
troversy" by weighing comparative advantages and disadvantages. 5  Here
the court may decline to certify only if there exists "truly available" alter-
native, superior procedures. Second, the court conducts a cost-benefit anal-
ysis. 5 6 The judge may reject a class action even when there is no alternative
for redress if she concludes that the benefits of the action are outweighed
by the adverse impacts upon the class, court or public; the burden of
establishing this is on those seeking to have the class action rejected.'5
An otherwise enthusiastic supporter of the Commission's conclusions takes
issue with the cost-benefit test, terming it ill-conceived because it requires
the measuring and weighing of matters that are impossible to compare, while
inviting lengthy and unproductive inquiries at initial stages of the action.' 5'
Moreover, it is argued that the test is unnecessary, since if an action is
manifestly inappropriate, it will be rejected under some test, as has been
151. Id. at 145-46.
152. The first four areas are drawn from a discussion in DuVal, Review, supra note 133,
at 411-19. The fifth is drawn from Prichard, supra note 67, at 320-22.
153. See II OLRC REPORT, supra note 27, at 343-47. See also DuVal, Review, supra note
133, at 412-14, for a discussion of the differences in the Commission's treatment of typicality,
adequacy of representation, and a preliminary merits test.
154. See, e.g., In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974); Holland v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 75 F.R.D. 743 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
155. II OLRC REPORT, supra note 27, at 401-11, 416.
156. Id. at 411.
157. Id. at 411-17.
158. Prichard, supra note 67, at 316.
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the experience in the United States, even if this distorts some other criteria. 159
Those who approve of the test agree that American courts have rejected
inappropriate class actions under other criteria such as predominance, su-
periority or manageability. But they believe it is important that such a
controversial basis for declining to certify should not be hidden in the cracks
of other tests but should be openly faced, particularly since the Commission's
approach encourages an explicit recognition that to reject a class action
means that no redress will be available, and that there are specific guides
to the court in assessing costs and benefits. 160
Second, the Report approaches the questions of opting out and notice
differently. Rule 23 gives absentees in a damage class action, subject to
limited exceptions, the right to remove themselves from the action. To be
able to so exclude themselves, the Rule stipulates that they be given the best
practicable notice, and individual notice must be given to those members
identifiable "through reasonable effort.' 61 After this, any members who
do not take measures to exclude themselves are included in the litigation.
However, the Commission requires the court to judge whether members
should be allowed to exclude themselves.1 62 Regarding notice, the Report
sees individual notice as not usually necessary at certification; 63 notice of
certification is to be given only if the costs of any such notice are outweighed
by the benefits, and here, as a part of the costs-benefits test, the court takes
into account whether members have been allowed to exclude themselves. 64
This recommendation has been criticized by the same commentator who
took issue with the costs-benefits provisions.1 65 Asserting that there is a
fundamental right not to be a plaintiff if an individual so chooses, he believes
a right of exclusion must exist. He agrees that there must not be a mandatory
notice requirement because of the cost it would impose, but suggests there
is no logical connection between the notice requirement and the unfettered
right to opt out. The right to be excluded should exist for those who -happen
to learn about the action by notice or otherwise.'6
While there may be no connection between opting out and notice as a
matter of abstract logic, there is a substantial connection in terms of notice
providing an opportunity to exercise the right to opt out. How can one
argue that opting out is a fundamental right and, in the same breath, admit
that, without a notice requirement, the opportunity to exercise it depends
solely on the chance discovery by the class member of the existence of the
159. Id.
160. DuVal, Review, supra note 133, at 413.
161. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(2).
162. II OLRC REPoRT, supra note 27, at 485-91.
163. Id. at 511.
164. Id. at 510-13.
165. Prichard, supra note 67, at 319-20.
166. Id.
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class and of the right to opt out? If it is asserted that opting out is so basic
a right, although the Commission carefully discusses why this is not so, 67
we are led ineluctably to the conclusion that steps must be taken to allow
everyone involved an opportunity to exercise it: the pressure to order costly
individual notice could be irresistible. Thus, the cost of celebrating the
individualism that unqualified opting out is supposed to enhance would be
a barrier to procedures which, in many circumstances, may be the only way
any individual or group will have access to relief.168
Third, the Report's recommendations for the determination and distri-
bution of monetary relief are much more specific and extensive than the
American Rule and, in some respects, go beyond provisions sanctioned by
United States courts. Issues surrounding proof and distribution of monetary
relief in class actions can be grouped under three different rubrics: (1) the
appropriateness of determining the monetary harm suffered by the class as
a whole; (2) the procedures to be used to determine monetary harm to
individual class members when that kind of assessment is appropriate; and
(3) how to employ the monetary relief that is recovered, and specifically,
can any monetary relief which has not been distributed to class members be
used in other ways and thus not returned to the defendant. 169 In American
courts, the assessment and distribution of monetary relief has been driven
by a focus on individual members of the class.170 In contrast, assessment on
a class-wide basis is the bedrock of the Ontario proposal, an approach
which, not surprisingly, has been excoriated by the established bar dedicated
to notions of individualism equated with prosecution of claims on a one-
by-one basis.' 7 ' It is only when aggregate assessment is not feasible or the
amount to which the class members are entitled cannot be established by
common evidence that individual proceedings would be required. 72 The
Report does recommend that members of the class be allowed to recover
their provable damages but substantially relaxes the normal Canadian proof
requirements through procedures similar to those used in the United States. 73
It would, however, allow average damage awards in appropriate cases. 74
Further, if all of the aggregate award cannot be distributed to class members,
the Report recommends that courts should be able to distribute the remainder
so as to benefit some or all members of the class; this resembles the so
called cy-pr~s distribution ordered in the United States. 75 Finally, the Com-
167. II OLRC REPORT, supra note 27, at 485-91.
168. DuVal, Review, supra note 133, at 415.
169. Id. at 416.
170. II OLRC REPORT, supra note 27, at 528-30, 538-43.
171. Macdonald & Rowley, supra note 148, at 354.
172. II OLRC REPORT, supra note 27, at 597.
173. Id. at 562-67.
174. Id. at 567-72.
175. Id. at 574-82, 602.
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mission concluded that if the aggregate award were not applied to directly
benefit members of the class, then, in order to achieve deterrence and the
prevention of unjust enrichment, the court could authorize that the unclaimed
residue be forfeited to the Crown. 176
DuVal, while strongly praising the Report, has questioned the neat division
which the Commission tried to draw between cy-pr~s and forfeiture distri-
butions.' 77 He suggests that the connection between individuals injured and
not otherwise compensated and the individuals who are benefitted by cy-
prus may be tenuous. Thus; cy-pr~s can result in a substantial component
of the award achieving only what forfeiture does: deterrence and unjust
enrichment. Moreover, DuVal has urged that such methods of dealing with
monetary relief can only be assessed by paying close attention to the un-
derlying policies behind particular causes of action to ascertain whether they
include deterrence and unjust enrichment. However, he approves including
such distribution in the recommendations since the courts would be unlikely
to recognize such innovative relief without explicit authorization. Yet, it is
also appropriate that such distributions are matters for the court's discretion
since this allows for decisions attuned to the underlying policies of any
particular substantive area.178
Fourth, the Commission's recommendations for changes in costs rules,
described as "[i]n some respects ... the most noteworthy achievement of
the Commission's report,' 79 substantially alter the present rules in Ontario.
Under existing law in Ontario, contingent fees are prohibited and lawyers
may not advance expenses incidental to litigation.8 0 The two-way costs rule
provides for an indemnification of a substantial part of lawyers' fees and
expenses for the class plaintiff if she wins. If the action fails, that plaintiff
is responsible not only for her own costs but also a substantial portion of
the defendant's lawyer's fees and expenses. Class members have no respon-
sibility either to make up the difference between successful plaintiff's total
costs and the less-than-total indemnity payable by the loser or to contribute
to the costs award payable to the defendant should he be successful. Thus,
under the present costs regime, the plaintiff is never advantaged by bringing
a class action. The surprise then is not that there have been so few class
actions, but that there have been any, given the severe economic disincentive
for such litigation.'
176. Id. at 582-96.
177. DuVal, Review, supra note 133, at 432-36.
178. Id. at 436.
179. Id. at 418.
180. III OLRC REPORT, supra note 27, at 721. Ontario is the exception in this regard, though
the extent to which contingency fees are actually used in other provinces is unclear. See id. at
723.
181. Prichard, supra note 67, at 312.
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Although it recognized the potential of public funding as a means of
relieving these disincentives,"' the Commission preferred adjustments in the
costs rules themselves. First, it recommended a "no way" costs rule so that
each side would bear its own costs regardless of the outcome, thus removing
the inhibiting impact of a "costs against" order upon an unsuccessful class
plaintiff.' Second, it provided for the class plaintiff's costs to be a first
charge, on a proportional basis, on any monetary relief recovered on behalf
of the class, thus providing a means for indemnifying the representative
plaintiff and ensuring that costs are shared by all members of a successful
class.18 4 Third, the lawyer for the class can accept the litigation on the basis
that she will be paid only if the class is successful, thus relieving the rep-
resentative plaintiff of the burden of paying her lawyer if the action is not
successful. 85 The court would stipulate what the lawyer for a successful
action should receive, based on the hours and quality of work, with an
additional sum for having assumed the risk of litigation by agreeing to be
paid only if successful. 8 6
The weakness of these recommendations is that they are premised on the
class recovering monetary relief so that the class lawyer can be paid. In
situations where only non-monetary relief is claimed, the disincentives sur-
rounding the plaintiff financing the suit will persist. One solution is to provide
for a one-way costs rule favoring plaintiffs. However, the Commission
rejected a one-way rule, for any purpose, retreating behind the need for any
rule to apply equally to plaintiffs and defendants in order to insure faimess.'1
Doubtless any rule should be fair, but it should also take into account the
disproportionate abilities of the aggregates who are targets of class actions
to absorb or pass on costs of litigation. 8 In an otherwise searching Report
the Commission simply refused to grapple with some hard realities circling
this question.
Finally, the Report made recommendations concerning the Attorney Gen-
eral, "perhaps the most unusual and provocative provision in the proposed
Act.' 89 The Commission would have the Attorney General: (1) be given
notice of all applications for certification;' 90 (2) be able to intervene in any
class action at any time;' 9' and (3) be permitted to apply to the court at any
182. III OLRC REPORT, supra note 27, at 711-13.
183. Id. at 704-09.
184. Id. at 713-14.
185. Id. at 714-31.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 706-07.
188. For treatment of these questions in the context of derivative litigation, see Wilson,
Attorney Fees and the Decision to Commence Litigation: Analysis, Comparison and an Ap-
plication to the Shareholders' Derivative Action, 5 WnrDsoR Y.B. AccESS JUsT. 142 (1985).
189. Prichard, supra note 67, at 320.
190. 1 OLRC REPORT, supra note 27, at 302-04.
191. Id.
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stage to remove the class plaintiff and become the class plaintiff with re-
sponsibility for the action including its settlement, subject to court ap-
proval. 92 These provisions were meant to reflect the view that class actions
serve not only the needs of private individuals and groups for access to the
courts, but also provide a vehicle for enforcement of public policies. Whether
or not class actions or any other procedure can divide the world into "pri-
vate" and "public" is a separate question that I will not attempt to answer
here,9 3 but housing "public" needs in the office of the Attorney General
is suspect, given that office's historical record as a protector of the public
interest.
In the Anglo-Canadian tradition, the Attorney General has been the public
official charged with litigating the issues affecting the "public interest" when
others lacked standing to bring litigation raising such issues. The record does
not reveal vigorous action here. Indeed, the Attorney General's resources
have most often been deployed in challenging standing claims-claims which
often involved or challenged the government that the Attorney General
represented or some emanation of it. 194 In class actions the potential for
conflict between the Attorney General and the class will often be present
since the theory of liability may often implicate the government in terms of
its action or inaction in preventing or asserting the activity causing the mass
wrong. 95 This is not to argue that the Attorney General should have no
role in class actions. It is to suggest that courts must be careful to scrutinize
that official's proposed role in any specific action to reveal any potential
conflict of interest or any advocacy based on governmental self-interest
disguised as service to the public.
CONCLUSION
The significance of class actions does not lie in the frequency with which
they are brought, for they have been, and will be, a small percentage of the
total of civil claims filed. Numerically, they have little to say about the
universe of disputes and the issues and questions surrounding them. Rather,
class actions claim our attention because they raise questions concerning
how society is structured and run-the manner in which the nation struggles
with the problems that a highly industrialized and regulated country must
face at the close of the twentieth century.
In all of this there is no argument that litigation-at least in Canada-
should be the dominant form of discourse for how we shape society.
192. Id. at 299.
193. See generally The Possible Unity of Public and Private Law: Symposium on the Public!
Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1289 (1982).
194. See, e.g., Bogart, supra note 9.
195. Prichard, supra note 67, at 321.
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Canadians in the past have looked to the legislature to make the critical
decisions concerning how we would become and continue as a nation. Ca-
nadians may have often become tired or angry at their government, but they
have never come to hate it, or to think it should be bounded and corralled
at every turn.196 Indeed much of the history of Canada is an account of
continuous government involvement in forging and shaping a nation from
forbidding and sprawling geography. 97 This is not to suggest that the leg-
islative record in terms of responsiveness or effectiveness or even protection
has always been fine. 9s It is to argue that historically, legislative action in
Canada has taken into account interests other than those wrapped in notions
of nineteenth-century individualism and has, however imperfectly, imple-
mented measures based on ideas of fairness and equality not only in op-
portunity but in result.
But no matter how strong the role of the legislature is, or should be, in
any society, this branch of government is unlikely to be able to address with
sufficient specificity the myriad issues surrounding particular actions taken
by other aggregates or its own agencies and emanations. Allegations against
such powerful groups concerning mass wrongs need to be addressed by a
body which is able to carefully sift through the evidence and arguments
relating to the argued injury and to forge a solution responsive to the
particulars which have been demonstrated in an open, public and scrutiniz-
able way. This is the function of a court.
196. The role of government in nation-building is a well-developed theme in the literature
on Canadian government and particularly in contrast to American attitudes. Consider, for
example, the following:
Canadian scholars too have been concerned with both the extent and cause of
the growth of government, but, when compared to that of our American neigh-
bours, our debate has had some rather marked differences. On the whole, Amer-
ican thought on this subject is dominated by a highly critical or suspicious attitude
to any form of (much less increase in) bureaucratic powers.... However, these
ideas have been generally characterized by a much more sympathetic attitude
towards governmental intrusions in [Canadian] society .... No Delphic phrases
and fundamental philosophies about government occupy our thoughts on the
nature of governmental institutions.
Wilson & Dwivedi, Introduction to THE ADmiNiSTRATIvE STATE iN CANADA 3, 4-5 (Dwivedi ed.
1982).
197. Wilson and Dwivedi write:
In summary then, Canadian historical experience shows bureaucracy as an in-
strument of overriding political purpose. The particularistic and localistic nature
of Canadian democracy required a bureaucracy, which has expanded under explicit
political directions and which has been subject to democratic political discretion.
The instrumental and indeed beneficial role of bureaucracy as the core of modem
government is a theme which is well developed in the literature of public policy
and administration.
Id. at 10.
198. Examples of the darker side of the legislative record, particularly in protection of human
rights, is provided in III MACDONALD REPORT, supra note 4, at 284-85, and Russell, supra note
11, at 34-35.
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Class actions allow litigation to be brought in a form responsive to ques-
tions concerning the activities of entities whose conduct can scarcely avoid
having mass ramifications. And seeing alleged wrongdoing by these aggre-
gates in the light of the consequences for groups is vital in order to assess
and to respond to such conduct. To force litigation to be brought on an
individual basis is to embrace a vision of the structure of society which-
and in many important ways, regrettably-no longer exists. To force it into
the traditional mold of litigation in the name of individualism may purport
to celebrate formally the value of each one of us but, in reality, it prevents
an effective means of confronting such aggregates with their capacity to pose
a greater threat to that individuality.
But what of class actions in Canada? Here the terrain is complicated. The
Ontario Law Reform Commission's Report is now almost five years old and
has not yet made it onto the legislative agenda, but the office of the present
Attorney General, regarded as very liberal in some quarters, gives assurance
that the subject is under "active consideration.'9 Quebec has had a number
of years experience with legislative overhaul. The number of class actions
initiated has remained below predictions, but those that have been brought
have not caused any dramatic or burdensome problems in their administra-
tion or in the issues which they have raised.
The courts themselves have manifested substantial ambivalence. They have
accepted a more expansive role in other areas: as a matter of first impression,
they have embraced their role as arbiter between citizen and state in Charter
litigation, a task requiring them to face directly complex social and political
questions. However, there is also a troubling tendency to view their mission
under the Charter as exclusively one of protection of those individual rights
which enjoy their greatest potential with the government kept at bay.20 And
in this there is a danger that Charter litigation will dissolve into a discourse
concerning a specific set of entitlements reflecting a particular brand of
individualism which does not capture the entirety and complexity of Canadian
society. 201
Perhaps it is this emphasis on individualism-and of a limited kind-
which can explain the Supreme Court's aversion to class actions mirrored
in Naken. The notion that judges should accept collective activity and,
indeed, adjudicate issues raised by a collective form strikes directly at the
image of the law and litigation which courts have created and reflected. Yet,
at least some lower courts seem determined to evolve away from this role
199. Letter from M. Cochrane, Counsel, Policy Development Division, Ministry of the
Attorney General to W. A. Bogart (Oct. 8, 1986).
200. See supra note 12.
201. For an extensive analysis of the array of ideas and movements which have influenced
Canadian political and social life, see W. CansTrmN & C. CAMPBEL, PoLmc PARTms AND
IDEOLOGY IN CANADA (2d ed. 1983).
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and embrace one which takes account of questions which can only be fully
comprehended by examining their mass impact.
I do believe that in the end we will see some form of class action in
Canada. In this there is no prediction about what the present Supreme Court
might do given another opportunity to review class actions, what any pol-
itician may do within the next few years, or what the details of this procedure
will look like. What I mean to suggest is that the approach of the courts
and the law to the organization of contemporary society, which class actions
capture, is what will ultimately find expression.? n I think Canada will have
class actions, because they reflect a reality that sooner or later must be
mirrored in litigation that affects so significantly the issues people bring to
courts. Canada is a highly industrialized and regulated society which will
repeatedly generate policies, issues, and consequences that the courts can
only respond to adequately by approaching them with an understanding of
how powerful entities function and affect, and at times injure, groups and
individuals. And this is why, if we did not have class actions, we would have
to go out and invent them.
202. A parallel point is found in the American literature: see in particular Chayes, The Role
of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. Ray. 1281 (1976) and Chayes, The Supreme
Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HLv. L. Rav.
4, 56-60 (1982).
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